Abstract-Planning will become an increasingly central function for the human operator as automation takes over more and more of the manual tasks associated with man-machine systems. In order to understand and aid the human in this role, an experimental methodology for the study of human planning behavior is needed. Further, a model of the process by which the human plans is desirable. A methodology is presented for studying planning, together with the results of applying the methodology within two experimental investigations of planning behavior of aircraft pilots in normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. Beyond showing that the methodology yields consistent results, these experiments also produced new concepts in terms of a dichotomy between event-driven and time-driven planning, subtle effects of automation on planning, and the relationship of planning to workload and flight performance.
I. INTRODUCTION I
N A RECENT PAPER [1] , the authors reviewed the problem of modeling human behavior in complex man-machine systems. One particularly important conclu sion of the review was that planning will become an increasingly central function of the human as automation takes over more and more of the manual tasks. Another conclusion was that the human's planning process is not very well understood. The purpose of the research reported in this paper has been to increase understanding in this area.
Previous researchers have certainly recognized the hu man's role as a planner in man-machine systems [2] . However, very few attempts appear to have been made to measure and model the human's planning process. Notable exceptions include several efforts in the field of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. Three especially im portant concepts have emerged. The first is that planning can be avoided if one employs a standard "script" [3] , typically within a particular environment, context, or "frame" [4] that specifies the likely sequence of events and appropriate actions within a domain. For example, one has a "driving to work" script that allows one to accomplish this task with a relatively low investment of effort.
A second important concept that has emerged is that of hierarchical planning [5] , [6] . In a planning hierarchy, the depth of planning can range from broad and sketchy to narrow and concise. In this way, one can avoid investing effort in detailed planning until it is necessary. Once one accepts the idea of hierarchical planning, interest in the determinants of the hierarchical level in which a planner chooses to operate is natural. This paper addresses that issue.
The combination of scripts and hierarchical planning emphasizes a rather top-down view of planning where goals lead to subgoals, plans lead to subplans, and the process smoothly progresses. An alternative view is the "opportunistic" model of Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth [7] . In this model, high-level and low-level aspects of plan ning compete for attention in a somewhat interrupt-driven manner. While one can view these interrupts as occurring randomly, the resulting perspective is of a rather disorderly process. A more palatable view is that "events" cause interrupts. The nature of these events is explored in this paper.
The overall goal of the research discussed in this paper has been to develop a methodology suitable for measuring planning activity and modeling the planning process of human operators in complex dynamic systems, in this case aircraft. This work has benefitted greatly from the concepts just summarized. The main contribution of this work has been the development of a rigorous experimental method ology, its application to two experimental studies within a realistically complex man-machine system [8] , [9] , and the interpretation of experimental results in terms of concepts for modeling the process of planning.
II. METHOD
This section outlines the experimental methods em ployed for this research. Considerably more detail can be found in [10] .
A. Subject Population
In the experiments, the planning process of aircraft pilots has been investigated. An HFB-320 Hansa Jet simu-0018-9472/83/0500-267$01.00 ©1983 IEEE lator at the Forschungsinstitut fur Anthropotechnik (FAT) was employed [11] .
Using this simulator, nine professional HFB-320 pilots flew several missions from cruise to touchdown. Three pilots participated in a pilot study, another three pilots in Experiment I, and the last three pilots in Experiment II. The subject population for Experiments I and II was highly homogenous, averaging just under 5000 flight hours each, of which approximately one-third were in the HFB-320. The pilots had little or no experience with flight simulators. The average age of the group was 39.
B. Flight Simulator
The HFB-320 Hansa Jet is a 5-12-passenger twin-engine jet used for both military and commercial purposes. It normally has a two-man crew.
The HFB-320 flight simulator at the FAT allows full maneuverability, is fixed base, and has no visual simulation of the outside view. The cockpit is an original mockup from the aircraft manufacturer. It is instrumented with conventional displays for flight, engines, and navigation as well as controls that include steering force simulation. Also, a fairly sophisticated autopilot as well as a flight director with V-bar indicators in the artificial horizon are available. However, some limitations are present as the flight instruments for the copilot, the controls in the over head panel, and a simulation of waypoints for navigation are missing. These limitations restrict the possibilities for simulating emergency situations. Further, it was necessary to run the experiments with a second experimenter playing the combined role of the copilot and the air traffic con troller.
C. Flight Scenarios in General

1)
Normal Scenario: Three flight situations were studied: 1) normal, 2) abnormal, and 3) emergency. The normal flight scenario Ν which was the basic one in these experi ments is illustrated in Fig. 1 with a plan view and a side view. There, eight flight phases are shown, namely: 1) cruise, 2) descent, 3) holding, 4) initial approach, 5) final approach, 6) landing, 7) ground roll, and 8) cruise to alternate. The overall mission of the Ν scenario lasted approximately 20 min, when no cycles of the holding pattern or cruise to alternate were to be flown. No unusual events occurred. In Experiment I, the Ν scenario was flown with three cycles of the holding pattern and lasted ap proximately 32 min, whereas no holdings were flown in Experiment II.
The pilots were asked to use the flight director and the automatic throttle system in order to obtain steadier flight conditions. This request remained unchanged throughout all flight scenarios.
2) Abnormal Scenarios:
The abnormal scenarios (denoted by A x and A 2 ) were characterized by procedural changes. In Experiment I, the pilots received information that the runway had been closed temporarily, snow removal was in progress, and they were requested to enter a holding pat tern. The information was given at two time instances, at 4.75 min after starting the experimental run, i.e., during cruise, in scenario A x , and at 13.75 min with a warning ("snowfall expected") at 8.25 min in A 2 . This resulted in a holding pattern before the descent in scenario Α,, whereas the sequence of the flight phases in A 2 was the same as in the basic scenario N. During the holding patterns in A 1 and A 2 , the additional flight phase 8) emerged as a possibility for the pilots, i.e., cruise to alternate. Before completing the third cycle of the holding pattern, the pilots received information that the runway was "clear and wet" and that they could continue their approach. Due to the three cycles of the holding pattern, these abnormal flights lasted ap proximately 32 min.
In Experiment II, abnormality A x involved a temporary runway closure due to snow removal announced 4.2 min into the flight and presented the possibilities of requiring the pilot to enter the holding pattern or to cruise to the alternate airport. Abnormality A 2 involved temporary CAT-III conditions due to a dense fog, which was an nounced 7.5 min into the flight and presented the same possibilities as abnormal situation A,. While the possibili ties of holding or cruising to an alternate were clearly shown on the map furnished to the pilot (and available in the cockpit), the abnormal situations were always resolved at the last minute, thereby avoiding holding or cruising to an alternative. In this way, all flights were limited to 20 min.
3) Emergency Scenarios: In Experiment I, the emergency flight scenarios (denoted by E x and E 2 ) were characterized by a failure of the right engine, namely, a shutdown. In case E { , the failure occurred a short time before the pilot would have been requested to enter the holding pattern in the basic scenario. Of course, holding had to be omitted with a single engine failure, which resulted in a time duration of the whole mission of approximately 20 min. The E 2 scenario included the same sequence of flight phases as the basic one, i.e., JV, with the single engine failure occurring shortly after the aircraft was expected to pass the outer marker (see OM in Fig. 1 ). In both cases, flight control was accomplished manually. Otherwise, the autopilot would have compensated for the engine failure, and the pilots would have been unable to detect it.
In Experiment II, emergency £, involved the failure of the right engine at 4.2 min into the flight. The failure was announced by an alarm in the cockpit similar to that in real HFB aircraft. In this way, there was no problem with the pilot missing the failure, even in flights with autopilot. Emergency E 2 involved a severe loss of hydraulic pressure due to a total loss of hydraulic fluid, i.e., even the hand pump for the gear was inoperative, and an emergency landing was requested. This failure was announced 7.5 min into the flight by an alarm in the cockpit.
D. Measures J) Depth of Planning and Time Line:
The objective of this study was to measure the planning process of pilots during the different flight situations just described. The notion of depth of planning has been introduced as the basic concept for this purpose. Depth denotes level of detail which can range from broad and sketchy to specific and concrete. The hypothesis was that planning with respect to a particular task need not be very deep if 1) the amount of time until the task must be performed is large; 2) the task is not critical to mission success; 3) the environment will apparently be "hospitable" to successful completion of the task (i.e., the probability of unusual or increased difficulty is low).
However, if one or more of these conditions ceases to hold, then depth of planning will increase to the extent that the conditions are not satisfied. In other words, the depth of planning associated with a particular task will be very great if the task that must be performed immediately is critical to mission success, and may be more difficult than usual to accomplish.
Thus the hypothesis is that depth of planning is affected by the three independent variables: time, criticality, and probability of increased difficulty. To evaluate this hy pothesis, measuring the depth of planning as well as its three independent variables was necessary. The measures for criticality and difficulty will be described in Sections II-D2 and II-D3, respectively.
For the first variable (time), a time line indicating when things were supposed to happen was constructed for all flight scenarios. This was done not only for the beginning of the eight flight phases but also for the beginning of three selected subtasks for each flight phase (see Table I ). The subtasks were chosen after discussions with aeronautical engineers and pilots in order to characterize a second, more detailed level of each flight phase by means of typical examples (e.g., altimeter, localizer intercept, gear, and cross-wind).
Depth of planning was measured by an on-line question naire technique. 1 As the flight proceeded, the pilots re ceived verbal queries concerning the depth of planning associated with the present and future flight phases and the three selected subtasks for each flight phase. These queries were presented in a random order.
It was important that the flight task of the pilots be disturbed as little as possible by the on-line questionnaire. Therefore, the pilots were thoroughly familiarized with the complete questions and possible responses during the in structions before the flights. 1 During the experiments, they "All instructions, ratings, and questionnaires actually used in the experi ments were in German. only heard short names of the flight phases and subtasks, e.g., final approach, cruise, or track intercept, crosswind. The answers were coded by numbers which were the only verbal responses of the pilots. In Experiment I, the pilots responded with a verbal rating on a five-point scale of depth of planning (see Table  II ). The associated text explanations for the possible re sponses in Table II only served as an aid for getting a feeling for the scale. The queries normally occurred every 30 s with air traffic and navigational information supplied in the intervals. If a depth rating indicated a detailed level of planning (i.e., four or five), more specific queries con cerning all three associated subtasks of that flight phase followed immediately, delaying the next query on another flight phase.
In Experiment II, depth ratings were made using a ten-point scale. This change was made to lessen the occa sional "chattering" between, e.g., ratings of two and three as obtained in the first experiment with the five-point scale.
Depth ratings were only made for flight phases 4), 5), and 6) (initial approach, final approach, and landing) in the second experiment. These three phases with their nine subtasks constituted a set of 12 possible queries to the pilot. All queries were randomly and independently chosen from the set of 12, with the exception that the three flight phases were twice as likely to be chosen as the nine subtasks. Queries occurred every 20 s with air traffic and navigational information supplied in the intervals. Thus, with 20-min flights and three questions per minute, there were 60 questions per flight, eight for each flight phase and four for each subtask.
For the data analysis, two measures for depth of plan ning were derived from the raw data: average depth and frequency of depth above threshold. The mean D was calculated as the average depth. The frequency measure has been defined as p(D > D 0 ), i.e., the number of depth ratings D which were above a certain threshold D 0 were counted.
2) Criticality: Data for criticality, one of the independent variables hypothesized to affect depth of planning (see Section II-D1), were collected off-line by using separate subjective scales for all flight phases and subtasks. The pilots were asked, " How important is each of the following flight phases and subtasks relative to the accomplishment of the overall mission?" An excerpt of the subjective scales for criticality assessment, which had to be cross-marked by the pilots, is shown in Fig. 2 . The order of the flight phases and subtasks for the complete set of scales is the same as that shown in Table I for the time line. The mean C was calculated as the average criticality.
3) Probability of Increased Difficulty: The probability of increased difficulty has been hypothesized to be another independent variable that influences depth of planning (see Section II-D1). This variable was again measured by an on-line questionnaire technique. The pilots were asked to rate the probability of increased difficulty of a task, given the current situation and state of the aircraft. They heard the short prompt "increase of difficulty" immediately fol lowing their response to each depth of planning query. Their answers were also coded using a five-point scale (see Table III ).
The probability of increased difficulty was not measured during the second experiment because of its high correla tion with depth of planning (see Section III-A2). 
4)
Workload: Dependent variables in the experiment included not only depth of planning but also workload and performance. After each flight of approximately 20 or 32 min, the pilots estimated their experienced workload sep arately for each of the flight phases. They used appropriate subjective rating scales [12] , [13] similar to those for criti cality, which had to be cross-marked. The subjective workload scales are shown in Fig. 3 . The mean W was calculated as the average workload.
5) Performance:
Extensive objective flight performance data were collected. The first approach was to consider seven performance tolerances. Two tolerances related to glide-slope and localizer deviations at a height of 200 ft. The remaining five tolerances concerned touchdown and included longitudinal position, lateral position, sink rate, bank angle, and pitch angle. The measure "number of performance tolerances exceeded" was evaluated only for Experiment I. Its drawback is the fact that an assessment of performance is only given for two flight phases: final approach and landing.
No single direct measure of performance seemed ap propriate for the entire flight. However, the pilot's control signals in terms of elevator, aileron, and rudder angles can be viewed as indirect measures of performance. This is similarly true for the attitude signals in terms of pitch and roll angles. Certainly, any deviation from the desired flight path has to be corrected by using one of these controls and changing the attitude of the aircraft. However, these con trols vary even for flights that stay exactly on the desired flight path. Thus a baseline is needed with which to com pare measures of control activity and attitude. A reason able choice is to use the same measures applied to the autopilot's activities as a baseline, i.e., the measures from manual flights are evaluated in contrast to the correspond ing ones from autopilot flights.
As a result of this consideration and after some sensitiv ity testing of data mainly from the first experiment (see below), the square roots of sums of variances, with respect to time-varying means, integrated over flight phases j and divided by their time duration T J9 were chosen as scalar performance measures for both control actions (σ Γ ) and attitude (σ^); e.g., for control The sum of variances of elevator, aileron, and rudder angles was taken for control actions. The variances of pitch and roll angles were calculated using similar equations and summed for the attitude measure o A . Some sensitivity testing of the performance data was undertaken before deciding to use the equations. The root mean square (rms) values were compared with the σ mea sures as shown in (1) . This comparison showed that the inclusion of the means determined by the flight course was misleading in the case of the rms values, especially as these are also included in the baseline activities with autopilot.
Another sensitivity test concerned the length of the time window (see (2) and (3)). It was varied with the values Τ = 10, 20, and 30 s. The results showed that the averaging effect was too strong with the longer time windows.
The last sensitivity test explored whether a measure without averaging the control and attitude signals would be more appropriate. Instead of (2), the following functions were calculated:
where U ( (t) is the mean over Τ = 10 s as in (3) . Then the following performance measure for the control actions during the flight phases j was taken, as opposed to (1) 
The attitude measure was calculated similarly. The difference between these Δ measures and the σ measures shown in (1) will be discussed in Section III-B2.
An additional measure was calculated for the final ap proach which was the combined rms value of the localizer and glide-slope (LOC/GS) deviations. The purpose of this measure was to consider the real errors observed during this flight phase. A comparison with the o A measure can also be found in Section III-B2.
E. Experiments J) Pilot Study:
The experimental studies have been accomplished in three parts, i.e., a pilot study, Experiment I, and Experiment II. In this section, general information and the experimental designs are discussed. The experi mental procedures are described in [10] . First, a pilot study utilizing three subjects was performed to test the feasibility of the flight scenarios and question naires. Several modifications were made during and after these tests concerning the flight simulator, the acquisition of performance data, the procedures and instructions for the flight scenarios, the questionnaires, and the computeraiding for the experimenter handling the on-line queries.
2) Design of Experiment I: Another three subjects par ticipated in Experiment I. During these flights, data on the planning process, probability of increased difficulty, and flight performance as explained in Section II-D were col lected. The treatments for the three subjects were the three flight scenarios described in Section II-C, i.e., normal (N), abnormal (A), and emergency (£).
With one repetition per flight scenario, a replicated Latin square design resulted. The experimental design that was actually used is shown in Table IV . It deviates from the Latin square design by the additional tests T X (N 0X ) and T 5 (N 02 ).
These tests were introduced as a reference for the basic flight scenario without on-line questionnaires, thereby allowing evaluation of the extent to which the question naires disturbed the pilots. The basic flight scenario itself was not changed for all tests JV ()1 , iV 02 , TV,, and N 2 . The other flight scenarios (Λ,, A 2 , E x , and E 2 ) were those explained in Sections II-C2 and II-C3. In both abnormal situations A x and A 2 , the autopilot was used, whereas all other flights were flown manually.
3) Design of Experiment II: Three other subjects par ticipated in Experiment II. During the flights, depth of planning and flight performance were measured as explained in Section II-D. The treatments for the three subjects were the five flight scenarios N, A x , A 2 , £ 2 , described in Section II-C, combined with two levels of automation, i.e., manual (M) and autopilot (A). The fiveby-two factorial experimental design actually used is shown in Table V From these results, one might conjec ture that abnormalities require more planning than emer gencies, perhaps because fixed procedures usually exist for dealing with "standard" emergencies, while procedures for coping with abnormalities are typically more ambiguous. Unfortunately, in Experiment I the differences between abnormal and emergency scenarios were confounded with the use of autopilot for the abnormal scenarios and manual control for the emergency scenarios. Thus the higher workload due to manual control during the emergencies might preclude planning. This confounding of independent variables was eliminated in Experiment II.
Considering the differences among flight phases (Table  VII) , it appears that initial approach, final approach, and landing are most interesting from a combined perspective of D, C, and W. This result motivated the change in Experiment II such that depth of planning queries were only made for these phases and their subtasks. In this way, more measurements were obtained for the most interesting aspects of the flight.
2) Relationships Among Measures:
In an attempt to de termine whether or not Z), C, W, etc., were unique mea sures, the correlation between each pair of measures was calculated. Using the results in Table VI, Table VII , there were two significant correla tions: C and W{r = 0.831) and W_ and o c (r = 0.851). While the other correlations among C, W, σ 0 and σ Α were all reasonably large, the small number of degrees of free dom associated with the highly aggregated measures in Table VII made ρ < 0.05 difficult to achieve. A more fine-grained correlation analysis was performed for Experi ment II and is discussed in Section III-B2.
Of particular interest is the fact that D was not signifi cantly correlated with C, W, σ Γ , or o A . This result is certainly consistent with the discussion in Section III-A1. A possible explanation for this result will be provided in Section IV-A. The correlation between depth of planning and probabil ity of increased difficulty was found to be r = 0.601 (p < 0.01). This result, as well as logistical reasons, dictated the decision to omit the probability of increased difficulty as a variable in Experiment II.
3) Time Histories of Depth of Planning:
Considering the six scenarios that included depth of planning assessments, eight flight phases, and three pilots, well over 100 time histories of depth of planning were collected. However, as noted in Section III-A1, depth of planning was greatest for the abnormal scenarios (A } and A 2 ). Therefore, in the interest of brevity, discussion of the time histories of depth of planning will be limited to those of one pilot for the A x and A 2 scenarios. These time histories are shown in III-A2), depth of planning is highly correlated with proba bility of increased difficulty, although admittedly, this rela tionship may have been significantly influenced by the pilot having to provide depth and difficulty ratings at the same instant. On the other hand, depth of planning ap- pears to have been only weakly related to criticality. Per haps a criticality measure conditioned on particular events (e.g., snow) might be a better predictor of depth of plan ning. Nevertheless, the results for difficulty and criticality noted in this paragraph led to their receiving much less emphasis in Experiment II.
Considering planning as it is affected by the time re maining until the flight phase in question begins, Figs. 4 and 5 as well as many other time histories lead to a particularly interesting conclusion. Apparently, two types of planning exist: event-driven and time-driven. Eventdriven planning is evidenced by increases in depth in response to events such as the report of "snow-runway closed" for A x in Fig. 4 . Time-driven planning occurs as the flight phase of interest is approached, as shown in four of the six time histories in Figs. 4 and 5.
The differences between event-driven and time-driven planning might be characterized by defining time-driven planning as monitoring the following of a script, while event-driven planning reflects the updating of the script because of an unanticipated situation. This conceptualiza tion will be considered in more detail in Sections III-B3 and IV-A.
B. Experiment II
As noted in Section II-E1, Experiment II was the third of a three-part series of experimental investigations. As such, Experiment II was carefully designed to test the hypotheses and conjectures which emerged from the pilot study and Experiment I. Consequently, the analysis of the data from Experiment II was much more rigorous and fine-grained. The results to be presented in the following sections are based on analysis of variance and, where multiple comparisons are discussed, on Duncan's multiple range test (see, e.g., [14] , [15] ). (Table VIII) . o c and o A were also significantly affected by the scenario (F 4 60 = 6.15, ρ < 0.001 and F 4 60 = 8.35, ρ < 0.001, respectively), with the E x scenario pro ducing larger values of o c and σ Α than the other four scenarios (Table VIII) .
While D and p(D ^ 8) did not differ significantly for the three flight phases, W, σ Γ , and o A were significantly affected (F 2 60 = 9.29,/? < 0.001; F 2 60 = 13.17,/? < 0.001; and F 2 60 = 6.19, ρ < 0.005, respectively). More specifi cally, landing produced significantly higher W and o c than the other two phases. However, o A was higher for initial approach than for the other two phases. These results are shown in Table IX. The main effect of level of automation was only signifi cant for W<ma o A (F l60 = 4.51,/? < 0.05 and F ]60 = 5.28, ρ < 0.05, respectively). As shown in Table X , manual control resulted in higher W and o A . The interaction of scenarios and level of automation significantly affected p(D > 8), and if the Ν scenario was omitted from the analysis, D was similarly affected (^6 0 = 4.54, ρ < 0.005 and F 345 = 2.99, ρ < 0.05, respectively). Table XI il lustrates the nature of this interaction. The basic result is that abnormal scenarios with manual control and emer gency scenarios with autopilot were similar in terms of producing larger values of both D and p(D > 8) than resulted with abnormal scenarios with autopilot and emergency scenarios with manual control. A possible ex planation of this interesting interaction will be discussed in Section IV-A.
2 Strictly, nonparametric statistics would be more appropriate but the pragmatic approach followed here seemed to be feasible. This argument has been adopted for the analysis of all data from on-line questionnaires and off-line subjective scales of Experiments I and II, i.e., for depth of planning D, criticality C, and workload W. While one might expect the abnormalities and emergen cies to have different effects on depth of planning, the results presented in Section III-B1 do not support this hypothesis, and no evidence exists for such a differential effect in Figs. 6-8 with the possible exception of the multiple-event scenario. However, the time histories of depth of planning for the "weather minima" and "runway condition" subtasks shown in Figs. 9 and 10 do exhibit this effect. This difference is clearly due to the fact that the abnormalities, which also occurred in the multiple-event scenario, involved inclement weather, while the other scenarios did not. Apparently, the measure of depth of planning for the overall flight phases is not sensitive enough to discriminate among types of event, at least when averag ing across subjects, levels of automation, and similar scenarios.
2) Relationships
Figs. 11 and 12 show the time histories of depth of planning for the "localizer intercept" and "glide-slope intercept" subtasks. The planning reflected in these time histories is clearly time-driven and not affected by dif ferences in scenarios. These results serve to point out that planning with respect to some subtasks may be unaffected by abnormal or emergency events; these subtasks may be viewed as purely time-driven.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A. Summary of Important Results
While a variety of interesting empirical results has emerged from the studies reported here, three results de serve special emphasis in this section. The first result of particular interest is the identification of the dichotomy between event-driven and time-driven planning. Ap parently, event-driven planning can be described as updat ing a script or creating a new script, while time-driven planning involves monitoring the execution of a script. The time histories of depth of planning presented in Sections III-A3 and III-B3 support this description in that the abnormalities and emergencies mainly affected the eventdriven portions of the time histories. The time-driven por tions were not differently affected by the scenarios because the plan had already been updated to reflect the abnormal ities and emergencies.
As noted in Section III-A3, this distinction between event-driven and time-driven planning appears to be analo gous to Schank and Abelson's distinction between plan ning and following scripts. This analogy must, however, be viewed as a hypothesis emerging from this research rather than as an empirical result. This hypothesis might be tested by having subjects discriminate between synthesizing plans and following plans. These two measures might be studied as they are affected by familiar and unfamiliar situations. What is not clear at this point is whether or not subjects "in the heat of battle" will be able to make this discrimina tion.
The second result of interest is the way in which depth of planning was affected by the interaction of scenario and level of automation in Experiment II. Why does the avail ability of autopilot result in decreased planning during abnormal scenarios and increased planning during emer gency scenarios? While one might postulate this effect to be a by-product of the lower workload during the abnormal scenarios, the low correlation between depth of planning and workload does not support this hypothesis.
This unusual effect of autopilot on depth of planning can perhaps be explained by the nature of the abnormal and emergency scenarios. The abnormalities involved changes in the environment (i.e., runway closure due to snow or fog), while the emergencies involved changes within the aircraft (i.e., engine failure or loss of hydraulic pres sure). Despite these differences, the average depths of planning were remarkably similar, averaging 6.31 and 6.22 for abnormal and emergency scenarios, respectively. Yet, the autopilot did have a differential effect on planning.
One can conjecture that the key to explaining this some what counterintuitive result is the effect of the autopilot on the types of event. The autopilot controls the aircraft but not the environment. Therefore, the autopilot can help to compensate for events within the aircraft but cannot di rectly affect events in the environment. Thus when an engine failure or loss of hydraulic pressure occurs, the autopilot can help to compensate and thereby free the pilot to plan the course of actions necessary to deal with the failures. As a result, the availability of the autopilot during such emergencies results in increased planning.
In contrast, abnormal situations such as the runway closures used in these experiments result in the pilot's main task being holding and waiting. While some planning might be associated with the possibility of diverting to an alter nate airport, this possibility was not heavily stressed in these experiments. Thus the planning that is necessary mainly involves the "holding" task. However, if the auto pilot is available, it performs much of this task and, as a result, the pilot's planning decreases.
To summarize the conjecture offered here, during emer gencies the autopilot frees the pilot to devote more time to planning; during abnormalities the autopilot assumes a significant portion of the task and lessens the need for planning. While this notion is somewhat speculative and needs further investigation, it does serve to emphasize the possible subtle effects of automation.
The third result of particular interest is the low correla tion between the depth of planning and workload or flight performance. While the fair to high correlation between workload and control activity agrees with one's intuition, the fact that an increased need for planning did not greatly affect perceived workload is rather counterintuitive. Quite possibly, the pilots perceived workload in terms of having to do something, and since planning is an internal activity, they did not associate planning with work or effort. Alter natively, this result can be viewed as evidence that workload is a multidimensional concept that cannot be reduced to a scalar metric. From this perspective, the human informa tion processing associated with the tracking task of flight control should be viewed as quite different from the infor mation processing associated with planning.
B. Implications of Results
The results presented in this paper have both methodo logical and theoretical implications. From a methodo logical point of view, the in-flight questionnaire techniques developed for this research, as well as the pre-and postexperiment questionnaires utilized, provided a variety of insights into human planning behavior that would not have been gained if only traditional performance and workload measures had been assessed. Indeed, the results of the correlation analyses reported here indicate that such tradi tional measures relate only weakly, if at all, to planning behavior.
While the assessment of depth of planning does suffer from being only an introspective report, this limitation is by no means as severe as encountered with verbal protocols because depth is measured quantitatively and can therefore be subjected to various statistical tests that account for experimental error. Of course, this increased rigor comes at a price of losing some of the richness of verbal protocols. One possible avenue of future research would be to utilize a mixture of the two methods.
Considering theoretical implications, perhaps the most important aspects of this research relate to the dynamic uncertain aircraft domain studied. Planning was driven by both the urgency of time and the occurrence of unantic ipated events. In this respect, the aircraft domain is quite different from the restaurants [3] and shopping trips [7] studied by other investigators of planning.
As a result of this difference, the aircraft domain pro vided evidence for both hierarchical, time-driven following of scripts and opportunistic, event-driven planning. Thus both extremes of hierarchical and heterarchical planning are useful for describing human planning behavior in com plex dynamic environments. Based on this conclusion, the next phase of this research should focus on integrating the formalized models of planning proposed by the researchers discussed in the introduction.
C. Conclusion
This paper has presented a methodology for studying planning behavior of aircraft pilots and discussed an appli 
